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Introduction1
The War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748)2 and the Seven Years’ War (1756–
1763)3 were the primary contexts in which maritime neutrality became a matter of 
fierce debate across Europe. Within the debates in these years, no problem of 
neutrality was of greater interest than the issue whether neutral goods on enemy 
ships and enemy goods on neutral ships were “free”.4 Scholarly discourse on this 
matter gained importance in the early history of the rights and duties tradition, on 
the one hand, and in the framework of the theory of the law of nations, on the other.5 
The War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War also formed the 
primary context of the most important interventions in German thought as well. An 
apogee in this debate was precipitated by a political controversy between Prussia 
and England. Prussia, that had been able to exit the war after the treaty of Dresden 
(1745), considered itself neutral and perfectly justified to trade with France, the 
arch-enemy of England. In response, however, British privateers seized several 
Prussian vessels laden with belligerent goods in 1747. The Prussian side in the 
1 This article has greatly benefitted from comments by Koen Stapelbroek, Admir Skodo, Taru 
Haapala and Paul Stephenson. I also wish to express my gratitude to the Swedish Collegium for 
Advanced Study (SCAS) for a grant received in aid of my research.
2 For an introduction to the War of Austrian Succession see Reed Browning, The War of the 
Austrian Succession (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). 
3 For a new and comprehensive introduction to Seven Years’ War in Europe see Franz A. J. 
Szabo, The Seven Years War in Europe: 1756–1763 (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2008).
4 Michael Schweitzer, “Neutralität”, Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur 
politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, eds. O. Brunner, W. Conze and R. Kosselleck (Stuttgart: 
Ernst Klett, 1978), vol. 4, pp. 317–37. See especially pp. 325–6.
5 Heinz Duchhardt, Balance of Power und Pentarchie: Internationale Beziehungen 1700–1785 
(Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1997), p. 74.
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conflict claimed that England hereby violated neutral rights, whereas the British 
held it to be their right to confiscate enemy property carried on neutral vessels. 
This controversy resulted in a long lasting debate about the rights and duties of 
neutrals. Christian Schmid explained in his Abhandlung von der Neutralität und 
Contreband-Waare (1761), that both sides sough to enlist the support of those whom 
were considered the most experienced and learned men to provide unshakable 
foundations for their respective causes.6
One of the scholars who defended Prussia’s right to trade was a young lawyer 
named Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717–1771) who is today known as one 
of the founders of modern political and economic thought in Germany.7 In 1747 
Justi’s fame was still in the making. He had made himself known mainly by winning 
a Berlin Academy prize with his critical essay on the monads.8 He had also founded 
his first journal Ergetzungen der vernünftigen Seele aus der Sittenlehre und der 
6 Christian Gottlieb Schmid, Abhandlung von der Neutralität und Contreband-Waare (Leipzig, 
1761). Republished in Sammlung auserlesener juristischer Abhandlungen das deutsche Staatsrecht 
betreffend, aus verschiedenen Sprachen ins deutsche übersetzt, ed. Johann Gottfried Senff 
(Leipzig: Müller, 1768), pp. 3–30. See page 12: “Niemals aber ist über diese Frage mehr gestritten 
worden, als da in dem vorigen Jahrhundert so öftere Kriege zur See entstunden, auch in dem 
jetzigen, besonders noch vor dem Aachener Frieden. Es ist dieserhalb endlich sogar, welches 
mir am meisten gefällt, bis zur öffentlichen Deductionen gekommen, zwischen den Königen von 
England und von Preussen, welcher letztere seine Handlung mit denen Franzosen, als damaligen 
Feinden von England, nicht aufheben wollte. Es wurden deswegen von beyden Seiten Gelehrte 
ausgesucht, die man in diesem Stück für die erfahrensten hielt, welche sehen sollten, ob diese 
Frage durch gewisse und unzweifelhafte Gründe könne ausgemacht werden.” 
7 Von Justi had a very eventful and colourful life that had a tragic end. He was a man of both 
theory and practice. Justi started his career as a soldier among the Saxon troops before studying 
legal and cameral sciences in Wittenberg from 1742 to 1744. In 1745 he began to publish his first 
journal and from here onwards, he kept editing at least one journal at a time basically for the rest 
of his life. Two years later Justi won an essay competition with his text Nichtigkeit und Ungrund der 
Monaden, in which he criticized Leibniz’ and Christian Wolff’s theory of monads. In this very same 
year Justi was appointed to the service of the widowed Duchess of Saxe-Eisenach 1747. Anna 
Sophie Charlotte of Saxe-Eisenach (1706–1751) was of Prussian origin, which could explain Justi's 
involvement on the debate on Prussian maritime neutrality. In 1750, Justi went to Vienna, where he 
was called upon to be chair of eloquenta Germanica at the Theresianum. His inaugural lecture was 
on the connection between the flowering of the sciences and the means to make a state happy. 
This lecture, which was also published, contained a detailed plan for teaching cameral sciences 
at the Theresianium. From 1752 Justi had the opportunity to teach them in practice as professor 
of Praxis im Cameral- Commercial- und Bergwesen. In the next year, Justi moved to Leipzig and 
from there in 1755 to Göttingen, where he became a Polizeidirektor and the first lecturer to teach 
cameral sciences at the University of Göttingen. Soon after, in 1757 Justi left Göttingen and went 
to work in the service of the Danish Court. After the short period in Denmark Justi maintained 
himself as a free writer until 1765. This was the time when he wrote most actively. He gained a 
pension from Prussia for his pro-Prussian and pro-English pamphlets. In 1765 he was appointed to 
an inspectorate of mines, glass-, and steelworks (Berghauptmann) in Prussia. Only three years later 
he was accused of having misused the state’s money. Justi died, nearly blind and imprisoned in the 
fortress of Küstrin in 1771. Best introductions to Justi are Ulrich Adam, The Political Economy of 
J.H.G. Justi (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2006) and Ferdinand Frensdorff, Über das Leben und die Schriften 
des Nationalökonomen J. H. G. von Justi (Göttingen, 1903).
8 J. H. G. von Justi, “Von den Monaden”, Dissertation qui a remporté le prix proposé par 
l’Academie Royale des Sciences et Belles Lettres sur le systeme des monades avec les pieces 
qui ont concouru (Berlin, 1748). For the context of Justi’s essay on monads see Thomas Ahnert, 
“Newtonianism in early Enlightenment Germany, c. 1720 to 1750: Metaphysics and the critique of 
dogmatic philosophy”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 35 (2004), pp. 471–91 and R.S. 
Calinger, “The Newtonian-Wolffian Controversy (1740–1759)”, Journal of the History of Ideas 30 
(1969), pp. 319–33. 
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Gelehrsamkeit überhaupt (1745–1749)9, which was at first published anonymously.
In an issue dated 16 March 1748 Justi decided to make himself known. He post-
poned all other topics and instead decided to dedicate the entire issue to a matter 
that he felt was of utmost importance. In his essay Erörterung der Frage: Ob 
kriegende Mächte der Handlung und Schiffahrt eines neutralen Volks nach ihres 
Feindes Hafen, in Ansehung der sogenannten Contrebandwaaren, einige Hinderniß 
und Schaden zu verursachen befugt sind?10 Justi reflected on when and under 
which conditions confiscation of contraband from neutral ships heading to enemy 
harbours could be considered just.
The issue in which Justi published his essay was dedicated to Samuel von Cocceji 
(1679–1755), the great Prussian jurist and theorist on whose ideas Frederick the 
Great based his reform plans.11 Justi praised Cocceji for his reforms that he greatly 
admired. The Prussian states could enjoy the improvement of the legal reforms 
and the Prussian example would therefore also encourage other states to follow 
its path. Likewise, in matters concerning Prussian neutrality, von Cocceji remained 
the main guide to furthering the Prussian interest. These views of Justi’s give us a 
hint about his intentions in writing his early essay on maritime neutrality. He was 
seeking the favour of the Prussian court by defining neutral rights very broadly. 
In this way we can say that in writing his essay Justi was providing the backbone 
for Prussia’s foreign policy in the War of the Austrian Succession. Justi, who was 
seeking a position in the Prussian administration, tried to catch the attention of 
Frederick the Great and his ministers. This became a lifelong dream for Justi, yet 
once it was fulfilled the results were disastrous.
As mentioned above, in 1748 Justi was still building his reputation. During the 
Seven Years’ War his star had already risen. Therefore, it is no wonder that the 
second time when maritime neutrality became a matter of great dispute, in the 
context of the Seven Years’ War, Justi’s opinion was much valued. Frederick II hired 
Justi as a pro-Prussian pamphleteer. Justi’s perspective on war and trade – and 
conquest and commerce – became famous through his war pamphlets, the most 
9 J. H. G. von Justi, Ergetzungen der vernünftigen Seele aus der Sittenlehre und der Gelehrsamkeit 
überhaupt (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1745–1749). 
10 J. H. G. von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage: Ob kriegende Mächte der Handlung und Schiffahrt 
eines neutralen Volks nach ihres Feindes Hafen, in Ansehung der sogenannten Contrebandwaaren, 
einige Hinderniß und Schaden zu verursachen befugt sind?”, Ergetzungen der vernünftigen Seele 
aus der Sittenlehre und der Gelehrsamkeit überhaupt, vol. 5 (1748), pp. 475–510. 
11 On Cocceji’s life see Roderich von Stintzing, “Cocceji, Samuel v.”, Allgemeine Deutsche 
Biographie, vol. 4 (1876), pp. 373–76. For Samuel Cocceji’s jurisprudence see Knud Haakonssen, 
Natural law and moral philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 135–45; and as Haakonssen states, there is a good account 
of the Coccejian reforms in H. C. Johnson, Frederick the Great and His Officials (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1975), pp. 106–133.
Trade and War : The Neutrality of Commerce in the Inter-State System
45
central of which are Chimäre des Gleichgewichts von Europa (1758)12 and Chimäre 
des Gleichgewichts von Handlung and Schiffahrt (1759)13. In these pamphlets Justi 
rejected the balance of power and balance of commerce doctrines as guidelines 
for European order. It was not through these “chimerical” doctrines that Europe 
could be stabilized, he argued, but only by fostering economic development across 
its various states.14 Neutrality appeared to Justi as an essential part of his solution 
to this problem of instability. He rephrased this problem in the form of the question 
of how to minimize the disruptive character of war on the economy of the state 
and on commerce in general. Confronting this problem required finding the right 
compromise between the rights of belligerents and the rights of neutrals. In what 
follows I will argue that the foundation for this compromise was to a great extent 
developed in Justi’s early essay, but that it was significantly reconceptualised in his 
war pamphlets published during the Seven Years’ War. The redefinition crucially 
hinges on the introduction of the concept of “taking the place of the enemy”, which 
I will explore below.
The interest that German political actors and theorists displayed in the issue 
of neutrality must be seen in the light of their wish to see the rise of German 
principalities from their economic and political backwardness.15 Within this 
framework neutrality served not so much as a means to avoid the horrors and 
destruction of war, but more productively as a facilitator of commercial development 
within and across states. Justi realised all too well, as one recent study put it, that 
the economic limits to politics were ‘set by the imperative need of modern nations to 
succeed in international trade’.16 Neutrality was an instrument to make the political 
and economic requirements for aligning state interests and reform the interstate 
system compatible with one another. With regard to the latter, Justi proposed 
the foundation of larger commercial monarchies that were competitive politically, 
commercially and militarily. To achieve a sustainable competition among states, he 
outlined a comprehensive political theory for the reform of Europe’s monarchies. 
In his view, civil liberty and moderate government were the basis of commercial 
12 J. H. G. von Justi, Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts von Europa: eine Abhandlung, worinnen 
die Richtigkeit und Ungerechtigkeit dieses zeitherigen Lehrgebäudes der Staatskunst deutlich 
vor Augen geleget, und dabey allenthalben neue und rührende Betrachtungen über die Ursachen 
der Kriege und dem wesentlichen Grunde, worauf die Macht eines Staats ankommt, beygebracht 
werden (Altona: Iversen, 1758).
13 J. H. G. von Justi, Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt, oder, Ungrund 
und Richtigkeit einiger neuerlich geäusserten Meynungen von denen Maassregeln der freyen 
Mächte gegen die zu befürchtende Herrschaft und Obermacht zur See: wobey zugleich Neue und 
wichtige Betrachtungen über die Handlung und Schiffahrt der Völker, und über den höchsten Punkt 
der daraus entstehenden Macht und Glückseligkeit beygebracht werden (Altona: David Iversen, 
1759).
14 Istvan Hont, Jelousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 35.
15 On Justi and German economy see Adam, Political Economy, pp. 55–9. 
16 Adam, Political Economy, p. 59, with reference to Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 185. 
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excellence, which had become the new aim of every state.17 Neutrality, on the 
one hand a regulatory principle in international trade and the distribution of wealth 
among states on the other hand galvanized Prussia’s aspirations to maintain its 
status as a new great power, which it had become after the victories of the two 
Silesian wars.18
It is important to understand that Justi drew a line between just and unjust 
neutrality, where the latter grew purely out of greed. The differences between 
Danish and Dutch neutrality served for Justi as examples between just and abusive 
neutrality. Prussia would do wise in following the footpath of the Danes. This would 
enable Prussia to catch up with France and England in a twofold manner. Prussia 
would increase its share of the trade while England and France whose enmity was 
likely to spill into wars several times also in the future, would weaken each other. 
In this way, Prussia would become more powerful, even more so because Justi 
believed that power was always relative. In this view Justi was building to a large 
extent on the political thought of Montesquieu.19
Prussian Neutrality and Rights and Duties 
in the War of the Austrian Succession
Systematic thinking on belligerent rights began to develop during the wars of the 
eighteenth century. These rights were above all defined in their relation to neutrals. 
It has been argued that what may be called to rival ‘schools’ of thought emerged: 
the necessity or “conflict-of rights” school and the “code-of-conduct” school. 
The representatives of the conflict-of-rights school maintained that the rights of 
belligerents and neutrals were necessarily and rightfully in opposition to each 
other. The representatives of the other, code-of-conduct, school maintained that a 
belligerent’s rights always found their correspondence in a neutral’s duty. And if a 
neutral has not committed anything wrong, no right can be exercised. The principle 
of necessity served often the cause of the belligerent whereas the code-of-conduct 
school was in favour of the rights of the neutrals. 20
Justi recognised the potential conflict between the rights of belligerents and the 
neutral right to trade. Drawing on Grotius, Justi stated in his Erörterungen that the 
17 Adam, Political Economy, pp. 233–238. 
18 On the concept of a great power see Hamish M. Scott, The Emergence of the Eastern Powers, 
1756–1775 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). On Prussia’s attempts to secure the 
newly gained power position on the second half of Frederick’s regime see Hamish M. Scott, “Aping 
the Great Powers: Frederick the Great and the defence of Prussia's international position, 1763–86”, 
German History 12 (1994), pp. 286–307.
19 Grete Klingenstein, “‘Jede Macht ist relativ’: Montesquieu und die Habsburger Monarchie”, 
Festschrift Othmar Pickl zum 60. Geburtstag, ed Herwig Ebner (Graz: Leykam, 1987), pp. 307–25.
20 Stephen C. Neff, “The Prerogatives of Violence: In search of the Conceptual Foundations of 
Belligerents’ Rights”, German Yearbook of International Law 38 (1995), pp. 41–72, 42–6, 53–7; 
Stephen C. Neff, The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000), pp. 44–60. Stephen C. Neff, War and the law of nations: A General History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 151–5.
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sea was no one’s property. Therefore, it was clear that it was open for neutrals to 
be used for their trading activities in times of war as well as in peace.21 Moreover, 
everyone had the same right to trade or not to trade. With Grotius Justi also argued 
that a nation was not obliged to trade with anyone against its own will. He wondered 
whether Grotius had here bent his own principles on this matter once Portugal had 
rejected the Dutch as trading partners. Since every nation was the master of its 
own trade there was no obligation to trade. On this matter Justi was building on 
Pufendorf, Thomasius and Huber in order to argue that a nation was entitled to 
decide with whom it wanted to trade and also to forbid trade in certain goods from 
and to its harbours, if it wished to do so. Every nation had the right to prevent import 
of contraband to its harbours. More difficult was the case with the contraband of 
war. Could a belligerent forbid a neutral from trading in certain goods?22
Justi stressed that belligerents had rights too. He emphasised that every 
belligerent, just as any nation, had the profound natural right of self-preservation: 
“The natural law allows us to prevent everything that can cause us injury”.23 It is 
in accordance with the right of self-preservation to oppose our unhappiness and 
decay – which is the aim of our enemy – in all possible means. In other words, 
the law of self-preservation gave the belligerent the right to prevent harmful things 
happening to him. Could neutral trade with the enemy not be considered harmful?24
However, the law of nature also ascribed the duty to the belligerent not to injure 
innocent third parties with whom he was at peace: “Even if the natural law allows us 
to prevent injuries and detriments; it also commands, that we may not injure a third 
party, with whom we live in peace and friendship.”25 In short, although natural law, 
in the name of self-preservation, allows us to prevent harmful things happening 
to us, it on the other hand commands that we are not entitled to injure any third 
party which is not involved in the clash itself.26 That is to say that belligerent may 
not prevent third parties in promoting their happiness, for example, by hindering or 
complicating neutral’s commercial activities. This would be a violation of the neutral 
right to trade. Furthermore, there was another argument against the belligerent 
right to interrupt neutral trade. There is no way a belligerent could force a nation to 
21 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 476. 
22 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 475–477.
23 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 482: “Das natürliche Recht erlaubet uns aber, alles dasjenige 
zu verhindern, was uns Schaden verursachen kann.” 
24 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 482. 
25 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 482: “Wenn uns das natürliche Recht erlaubt, unsern 
Schaden zu verhindern: so befielet es auch, daß wir einem Dritten mit dem wir in Friede und 
Freundschaft leben, keinen Schaden zufügen sollen.” 
26 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 482. On Justi’s natural law theory see Ere Nokkala, “Passion 
as the foundation of natural law in the German enlightenment: Johann Jacob Schmauss and J.H.G. 
von Justi”, European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire 17 (2010), pp. 113–23.
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trade according to its wishes since how could it give commands for a nation living 
in the free state of nature. No state had such authority over another.27
However, Justi was willing to look at the situation from the view point of the 
belligerent: was it really the case that the belligerent was bound to watch its enemy 
grow stronger and stronger with the help of a neutral nation?28 Justi did not directly 
refer to the conflict between England and Prussia of the time. However, as we will 
later see, this was clearly on his mind. Could a nation (England) not seize goods from 
neutral vessels (from Prussia), if they were shipping goods to the enemy harbour (in 
France)? Justi argued that the question was not so easily resolved and not even the 
greatest authorities in natural law provided us with guidance. Not even Pufendorf 
had touched upon the issue and Grotius had written very little about it. Therefore, 
Justi believed, his essay would be most useful for his readers.29 He emphasised 
the urgency of his topic: the empirical reality was full of examples of the seizure 
of enemy ships since one heard all the time news of neutral ships confiscated 
because of carrying contraband of war. It was to be decided, whether this was just.30
The Principle of Impartiality
Justi’s starting principle was that neutrals should be allowed to trade as long as they 
behaved in a genuinely neutral fashion. Therefore, the definition of just neutrality 
needed to be precise. Justi understood neutrality in terms of impartiality, of not 
giving “preference to either of the two belligerents.”31 A neutral state’s impartial 
status was directly compromised if the neutral joined the position of the enemy 
(an der Feindes Stelle) by, for example, lending provisions to a besieged city. The 
neutral also became an enemy by providing fortresses under siege with gunpowder 
or other war supplies (Kriegsbedürfnisse).
Justi’s position presented a rather mainstream German view, to be found 
also in Zedler’s Universal-Lexicon (1740), where neutrality is defined in terms of 
impartiality, as an equal attitude towards both belligerents – a third party that lived 
in peace with both belligerents, and gave no preference to any one of them.32 This 
27 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 484–5, p. 489. 
28 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 491: “Allein, soll denn eine kriegende Macht so ganz gelassen 
wahrnehmen, daß ihr Feind verstärket wird, ist sie denn schuldig, mit kaltem Blute zuzusehen, daß 
ihrem Feinde die Mittel in die Hand gegeben werden, womit er ihr Unglück verursachen will?”
29 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 477–8. 
30 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 478. 
31 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 493: “Das Wesen der Neutralität bestehet darinnen, daß 
sich ein Volk, das neutral seyn will, in Ansehung zweyer in Krieg begriffenen Mächte gegen einen 
Theil, wie gegen den andern bezeugt, und keinem Theil einzigen Vorzug zugestehet.” 
32 Johann Heinrich Zedler, “Neutralität”, Zedler’s Großes Vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller 
Wissenschaften und Künste, vol. 24 (1740), pp. 382–388. See p. 382: ‘Neutralität […] heißt eine 
solche Aufführung, da zwischen zwey kriegenden Partheyen der dritte sich also verhält, daß er 
mit beyden im Friede lebet, und keinem vor dem andern beyfällt, noch einige Gunst oder Vortheil 
einräumet.” 
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position entailed a departure from Grotius’s classical perspective in which neutrals 
were obliged not to harm the just side and not to help in any way the unjust side 
in the conflict.33 The entry in Zedler’s Lexicon instead presented this argument 
as contradicting the very principle of impartiality. As Schmid put it later, in 1761, 
echoing Bynkershoek’s famous dictum: “for those, who are neutral, the war, in 
which it does not want to participate, must not look neither just nor unjust”.34
Impartial behaviour could take the form of equal refusal or equal co-operation. 
Johann Paul von Vockel, an officer of the Saxon army took a stand on this issue 
in an essay compiled on the battlefield. In his Rechtliches Bedencken über die 
Natur, Eigenschaften und Würckungen der Neutralität, auch unterschiedene 
daraus fließende besondere Fragen Vockel first argued that a neutral should treat 
belligerent parties in an equal manner, without giving preference to neither one of 
them.35 Subsequently, instead of dividing neutrality into a general and a specific 
form, as was usual at the time, he argued that neutral behaviour was a twofold affair. 
Neutrality could either be permissive (die permissive oder erlaubende Neutralität) 
or prohibitive (die prohibitive oder verbiethende Neutralität).36 Examples of objects 
of permission or prohibition he gave were the marching of troops and recruits 
through neutral’s soil, the export of provisions and ammunitions, the acceptance 
and conveyance of deserters, the passage of prisoners of war and transport of 
captured goods. Within a state of permissive neutrality some or all of the above 
actions were equally permitted to both belligerents, whereas in a state of prohibitive 
neutrality they were equally forbidden to all parties in the conflict. The difference 
between the two positions in reality often was not a matter of legal ‘choice’ but a 
33 Zedler, “Neutralität”, p. 383: “Denn diese erfordert, daß ein neutraler Staat sich in die 
Streitigkeiten der kriegenden gar nicht menge: welches letztere aber geschehen, und eine 
offenbare Partheyligkeit andeuten würde, wenn er die Sache der einen Parthey als eine gerechte, 
und die Sache der andern als eine ungerechte, dergestalt äusserlich tractiren wolte, daß er nur 
dasjenige unterliesse, was der einen Parthey, deren Sache er vor ungerecht hält; und nicht auch, 
was der andern, deren Sache er vor gerecht hält, zum Vorschub gereichen könte; und wenn er die 
Bewegungen nur der einen Parthey, deren Sache er vor gerecht hält, nicht hindert, wohl aber die 
Bewegungen der andern Parthey, deren Sache er vor ungerecht hält. Vielmehr muß ein neutraler 
Staat, da er sich in die Sache der kriegenden gar nicht mengen will, auch die Gerechtigkeit oder 
Ungerechtigkeit derselben, zum wenigsten äusserlich, dahin gestellet gesetellet seyn lassen, und 
also nicht, wie Grotius meynet, in seinem äusserlichen Verfahren einen Unterscheid machen, ob die 
Gerechtigkeit der Sache der einen Parthey seiner Meynung nach gewiß, oder zweiffelhaftig sey. For 
Justi’s corresponding view see von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 484. In dem natürlichen Stande 
der Freyheit kann sich niemand einer Erkenntniß anmaßen, ob in Streitigkeit dieser oder der andre 
Theil Recht hat. Alle andere, die in diesen Streitigkeiten nicht begriffen sind, können sie also als 
gleichgültig ansehen, und als Dinge, sie ihnen nichts angehen.” For a more general context see also 
Tara Helfman, “Neutrality, the Law of Nations, and the Natural Law Tradition: A Study of the Seven 
Years’ war”, The Yale Journal of International Law 30 (2005), pp. 549–86, 561.
34 Schmid, Abhandlung, p. 20: “Denenjenigen, die neutral sind, muß der Krieg, darein sie sich nicht 
mischen wollen, von beyden Seiten weder gerecht oder ungerecht scheinen.”
35 Johann Paul von Vockel, Rechtliches Bedencken über die Natur, Eigenschafften und 
Würckungen der Neutralität, auch unterschiedene daraus fließende besondere Fragen. Frankfurt; 
Leipzig, 1746), p. 7. 
36 von Vockel, Rechtliches Bedencken, p. 7: “Bey der permissiven Neutralität sind diese Objecta 
alle, oder einige dererselben in dem Lande dasjenigen, der solche auf sothane Weise declariret, 
einem Theil, wie dem andern erlaubt; bey der phohibitiven hingegen einem wie dem andern 
verbothen.”
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question of military power of the neutral. Whereas a state of permissive neutrality 
required no power to be upheld, prohibitive neutrality required the support of military 
force. The neutral had to be strong enough to enforce its neutral rights and was 
entitled to raise arms and defend its neutrality against a belligerent that violated 
its rights.37 In these passages Vockel was anticipating the idea of armed neutrality 
and even used the concept die neutrale Puissance to designate a counterforce to 
the powers of war.38
Prussia, on this count, was without any considerable sea power and had to rely 
on legal argument as part of its defence of its neutral trade. According to Justi it 
was clear that a belligerent was entitled to seize goods from neutral ships that were 
clearly going to be used against it. However, if the same goods had been sold also in 
peace time trade, the matter of their confiscation was considerably more complex. 
The belligerent would have to prove that the neutral was not engaged in trade in 
this good in peacetime.39 A compromise between the English position (defending 
the right to confiscate goods) and the Prussian (the right to trade with belligerents) 
was ultimately reached through invocation of the concept of ‘goods of war’.
The Concept of Goods of War
The concept of the ‘goods of war’ (Kriegsbedürfnisse) was used in order to 
discriminate between goods that could and that could not be confiscated justly 
by a warring party. Grotius had argued that such goods of war could be identified 
through dividing all goods up into three different classes corresponding to the 
degree to which they supported belligerents’ war efforts: firstly, there were goods 
that were of use only in war; secondly, goods that were of use both in war and peace; 
and thirdly, goods that were of no use in war. Several German authors who wrote 
on neutrality contested the very use of the concept of contraband, and especially 
of Grotius’s distinctions. As long as neutrals behaved impartially towards both 
belligerents (gleiches Verfahren gegen beyde Partheyen) they remained neutral. 
The kind of goods that were traded was thus not decisive.40 Zedler’s Universal 
Lexicon emphasised that even arms and munitions could be sold without injuring 
the rights of a neutral, as long as they were sold impartially, i.e. to both belligerents. 
Soldiers too could be sold to belligerents. Zedler as well the anonymous author of 
37 von Vockel, Rechtliches Bedencken, pp. 5–8. For similar views see [anonymous], Abhandlung 
von der Neutralität und Hülfsleistung in Kriegeszeiten (Gotha, 1758).
38 von Vockel, Rechtliches Bedencken, pp. 10–11. 
39 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 491: “Denn wenn nach dem Natur- und Völkerrechte mit dem 
Kriegsbedürfnissen gehandelt werden kann, wenn es erlaubet ist, in Friedenszeiten mit dergleichen 
Waaren in ein Land zu handeln; so ist es ja mehr als sonnenklar, daß eben der Krieg, welcher 
entstehet, wovor aber neutrale Völker nicht das geringste können, diesen Handel verhindert, und 
folglich diesen neutralen Völkern Schaden verursachet.”
40 Zedler, “Neutralität”, p. 384: “[…] indem der Waffen- und Munition-Handel auch ohne alle 
Partheylichkeit und feindselige Absicht getrieben werden kan, und also der Neutralität gleichfalls 
nicht eben nothwendig zuwider ist.” 
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the Abhandlung von der Neutralität und Hülfsleistung in Kriegeszeiten (1758) used 
the example of Switzerland to point out that no one questioned Swiss neutrality, 
while the Swiss went so far as to provide mercenary troops to France. This was not 
considered a breach of neutrality since the Swiss offered troops to both sides in the 
armed conflict. However, experience and the customs of nations demonstrated that 
no belligerent allowed such trade to take place that allowed its enemy to prolong 
the war effort against him.41
The most radical argument against the concept of contraband of war was 
provided by Schmid who claimed that lifeless creatures, unlike reasonable 
creatures, are not in themselves responsible for unjust actions. Guns live neither 
justly nor unjustly.42 In his opinion the whole concept of contraband was only a tool 
applied to weak neutrals not capable of supporting their claims by force. Schmid 
argued that only countries whose strengths lay in scholarly argument and trade 
were interested in such concepts. Schmid pointed out that the Spaniards, who 
possessed a considerable sea power, ridiculed such declarations, because the 
argument they offered – approximately forty good battleships ready to go to war – 
carried greater force.43
Justi’s defence of broad neutral rights on the other hand was theoretically 
founded on his concept of the ‘goods of war’ (Kriegsbedürfnisse). Unlike Grotius, 
Justi divided the goods supplied during war into two categories. First, there were 
goods that could be used only in war. Second there were goods that were useful 
both in war and peace.44 To the former belonged gunpowder, ammunitions, cannons 
and arms including armament of warships. To the latter category belonged grain, 
iron, and ship tools such as masts, sails and ropes. Justi’s point was not to show 
that neutrals were prohibited trade with goods that fell in the first category, such 
as guns. In order to prohibit trade with these goods evidence was required that 
showed that the neutral was also excluded from trade in these goods in peacetime.45 
Neutrals should not have to pay any price for exercising their perfect right to trade 
even with the first type of goods.46 A neutral nation carrying goods of war to enemy 
harbours could not be held guilty of an injustice as it was only exercising its right to 
trade without injuring anyone. Here Justi was following in the footsteps of Samuel 
41 [anonymous], Abhandlung, pp. 154–5.
42 Schmid, Abhandlung, pp. 19: “Ich weiß nicht, ob an und vor sich denen leblosen Geschöpfen eben 
so wohl ungerechte Handlungen können beygemessen werden, als denen vernünftigen Creaturen. 
Die Canonen können für sich selbst weder gerecht noch ungerecht leben, daß Schießpulver wird 
keinen an seiner Ehre beleidigen, Holz, Stricke, Thauwerk sind nicht fähig, jemandem ein Recht, 
das er durch einen Vertrag erhalten hat, zu nehmen, Spieße können nimmermehr Lügen begehen, 
und dergl.” 
43 Schmid, Abhandlung, p. 20.
44 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 492. 
45 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 491. 
46 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 484: “Es ist also gewiß, daß auch Kriegsbedürfnisse 
Waaren sind, womit Handlung getrieben werden kann.”
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Cocceji, who had argued that since the neutral had voluntarily decided to stay out 
of war, parties in the conflict should neither hinder the neutral’s movement, nor 
prevent it from exercising its rights, even if it was the case that the power of one 
belligerent increased more than the power of the other as a consequence of neutral 
trade in steel, guns and other war supplies.47
The division between two types of goods of war that Justi put forward did not 
serve to prevent neutrals from engaging in trade, but rather to define the rights of a 
belligerent to confiscate goods that could potentially endanger its self-preservation. 
A belligerent had a right to capture first class goods of war, while the neutral had 
no duty to refrain from carrying it. To appreciate the principle of impartiality and 
neutrals’ rights Justi argued that belligerents were entitled to capture these goods, 
but only against compensation. A belligerent was entitled to confiscate armaments 
on the condition that neutral parties did not suffer from the war. On this principle, 
the capturer had to pay the price of the captured goods. The burden of evidence 
to determine the amount of the compensation lay on the side of the neutral party 
which had to show the ship’s books.48
In Justi’s model of maritime neutrality, trade should continue without disruption. 
This conclusion, unsurprisingly, was very favourable to Prussia. The neutral right 
to trade was respected simultaneously with the belligerent right to seize whatever 
could be used to injure his enemy. It followed from the demand of impartiality 
that the intercepted goods by virtue of their being intercepted were bought by the 
other party, since the neutral was not to suffer from the war. In this was the just 
price was paid for the goods, while the ship itself could not be confiscated. Unlike 
Bynkershoek, Justi did not think that neutrals ought to run these risks.49 Neutral 
merchants were entitled to receive their profits one way or another.
Justi argued that the ongoing war showed many examples of confiscation 
without payment. In these cases neutrals were treated as de facto enemies. In his 
essay Justi was directly praising French policy in the War of Austrian Succession. 
According to Justi the French had paid for goods confiscated from neutral vessels.50 
In taking this stance Justi explicitly criticised British policy towards neutrals and 
above all the confiscation of Prussian ships. England treated Prussian subjects 
and thereby Prussia as the enemy.
47 Samuel von Cocceji, Samuelis L. B. de Cocceji Novum systema iustitiae naturalis et romanae: 
in quo praemisso principio generali omnia iustitiae naturalis praecepta complectente I. Iura Dei in 
homines demonstrantur II. Iura hominum inter se iuxta tria iuris Romani obiecta exponuntur simulque 
universum ius Romanum in artem redigitur (Halle, 1748), § 789. 
48 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, p. 495: “Die Kauffartheyschiffe einer neutralen Nation, sind also 
schuldig, den Kriegesschiffen und Armateurs einer kriegenden Macht ihre Schriften vorzuweisen. 
Wenn nun diese daraus ersehen, daß unter der Ladung des Schiffes Kriegsbedüfnisse von der 
ersten Art befindlich sind, und daß sie in feindlich Häfen und Länder geführet werden sollen; so sind 
sie befugt, solche an sich zu nehmen. Allein auf keine andre Art als gegen baare Bezahlung: und 
zwar noch eben dem Preise, als man beweisen kann, daß sie in den feindlichen Ländern bezahlet 
werden. Die neutralen Nationen sind nicht schuldig, dem geringsten Schaden zu leiden.” 
49 Helfman, “Neutrality”, p. 562.
50 von Justi, “Erörterung der Frage”, pp. 507–8.
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The Seven Years’ War and the Future of 
Prussia in the Balance of Power
Christian Schmid, who commented on the context of Justi’s Erörterungen, asserted 
that the case between England and Prussia was never solved and England thus 
continuously confiscated Prussian ships and other neutrals until the end of the 
War of Austrian Succession.51 Frederick II demanded restitution and formed a 
committee to prepare a memorandum on the matter. To strengthen his demands 
he refused the payment of the final institution of the Silesian loan. This Silesian 
loan, which amounted to two hundred and fifty thousands pounds, had been taken 
out by Emperor Charles VI from British merchants in 1734. The payment of the 
loan was to be made from the revenues of Silesia. When Silesia was conquered 
by Prussia, Frederick II bound himself to the payment of the loan. However, once 
English privateers had started to confiscate the property of his subjects and take 
them to prize courts, Frederick refused further payments.52
At the head of Frederick’s committee was none other than the famous lawyer 
Samuel Cocceji. Under his direction the committee prepared a memorandum called 
Exposition des Motifs (1752)53, written in French and accompanied by an English 
translation. England responded also in a formal manner in a report enclosed in a 
letter of the Duke of Newcastle to a Prussian minister. This report is known as the 
The Duke of Newcastle’s Letter.54 According to the Prussian memorandum, the sea 
was free. The search of neutral ships on the free sea was against the law of nations. 
There was no cause for legitimately searching a free ship if the ship’s books were 
shown as proof that the vessel carried no contraband goods. Neither was it in 
accordance with the law of nations if captured ships were taken to the English prize 
courts. The English perspective on the matter was that though the sea was indeed 
free, a belligerent had a permanent right to capture enemy goods. Furthermore, the 
historical record showed there had been a long practice of taking seized ships to 
the capturer’s court. The case was ultimately settled when England agreed to pay a 
restitution of twenty thousand pounds, considerably less than originally stipulated. 
In exchange Prussia paid the remaining forty thousand pounds of the debt and 
51 Schmid, Abhandlung, p. 12.
52 Ernest Satow, The Silesian Loan and Fredrick the Great (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1915). 
53 Exposition of the motives, founded upon the universally received laws of nations which have 
determined the King (of Prussia) upon the repeated instances of his subjects trading by sea, to 
lay an attachment upon the capital funds which His Majesty had promised to reimburse to the 
subjects, of Great-Britain, in virtue of the peace-treaties of Breslau and Dresden = Exposition des 
motifs, fondés sur le droit des gens universellement reçû, qui ont déterminé le roi, sur les influences 
réiterées de ses sujets commerçants par mer, à mettre arrêt sur les capitaux, que Sa Majesté avoit 
promis, de rembourser aux sujets de la Grande-Bretagne, en vertu des traités de Breslau & de 
Dresde (London, 1752).
54 The Duke of Newcastle’s letter, by His Majesty’s order, to Monsieur Michell, the King of Prussia’s 
secretary of the embassy, in answer to the memorial, and other papers, deliver’d, by Monsieur 
Michell, to the Duke of Newcastle, on the 23d of November, and 13th of December last. Published 
by authority (London, 1753).
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interests. Later, both sides celebrated their memoranda as scholarly victories that 
had convinced the opponent.55 The settlement was conditioned by the so-called 
Diplomatic Revolution, as part of which the Convention of Westminster (1756), a 
defence alliance between England and Prussia, was written. In this reversal of 
alliances Austria allied with its old archenemy France, whilst England and Prussia 
joined forces.
The simultaneous rivalries between France and England, and between Prussia 
and Austria, spilled over into war in 1756 with Prussia’s attack on Saxony. The role 
of neutrals became subject to fierce debate.56 Of special interest were the United 
Provinces and Denmark, smaller states that received invitations to ally themselves 
to both sides in the conflict.57 These invitations went along with arguments about the 
balance of power: the navies of Denmark and the United Provinces could influence 
the balance of the war effort. Several French writers questioned England’s actions 
on the sea and especially England’s behaviour towards the neutrals. Perhaps most 
famously, Maubert de Gouvest (1721–1767) argued that England was about to 
destroy the balance of power which was the rule of peace and war in Europe as a 
result of its absolute command over the seas and maritime commerce. The trade, 
the intrinsic mechanisms of which controlled and maintained the balance of power 
was falling in the hands of England.58 England’s seizure of neutral Dutch ships and 
the Navigation Acts were indications of vicious aspirations to create a universal 
monarchy. In the same vein Marquis Paul de L’Hopital, French ambassador in Saint 
Petersburg had called England the despot of the seas and had argued that to 
prevent the universal monarchy of England there was a need to halt its maritime 
ravages. Otherwise, not only the freedom of seas, but also the freedom of Europe 
would be lost.
In his role as Prussian and Hanoverian propagandist, Justi attacked a host of 
enemies. In order to justify Prussia’s attack on Saxony Justi wrote a book called 
Leben und Character des Königl. Pohlnischen und Churfürstl. Sächs. Premier-
Ministre Grafens von Brühl in which he presented Count Brühl’s regime as an 
example of ministerial despotism. Justi argued that Prussia had saved Saxony from 
55 Adolf Trendelenburg, “Friedrich des Grossen Verdienst um das Völkerrecht im Seekrieg”, 
Monatsberichte der preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1866), pp. 29–52.
56 Seminal for this context is Koen Stapelbroek, “Universal Society, Commerce and the Rights 
of Neutral Trade: Martin Hübner, Emer de Vattel and Ferdinando Galiani”, COLLeGIUM: Studies 
Across Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences 4 (2008), pp. 63–89. See also John 
Shovlin, “Selling American Empire on the Eve of the Seven Years War: The French Propaganda 
Campaign of 1755–1756”, Past and Present 206 (2010), pp. 121–49.
57 Matt Schumann and Karl Schweizer, The Seven Years War: A Transatlantic History (London: 
Routledge, 2008), pp. 176, 185.
58 Matthew S. Anderson, “Eighteenth-Century Theories of the Balance of Power,” Studies in 
Diplomatic History, eds. Ragnhild Hatton and Matthew S. Anderson (London: Longman, 1970), pp. 
183–98. See pages 192–3.
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the rule of this tyrant.59 Directly after Sweden joined the alliance against Prussia, 
Justi launched a frontal attack on Sweden by condemning its decision to join the 
war. The Swedish constitution, which allowed the tyranny of one party, had opened 
the doors to such an unwise decision.60 Hence, it did not come as a surprise that 
Justi also attacked the French pamphleteers whose critiques of English policy on 
neutral trade clearly were thinly concealed attempts to lure Denmark and the United 
Provinces to stand by their rights which suited the French interest.61 In his Chimäre 
des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt Justi dismissed the arguments 
presented in Maubert’s anonymously published pamphlets Citoyen Amsterdam and 
Politique Danois.62 Maubert de Gouvest presented the standard French position on 
the balance of power in his book Politique Danois. According to Maubert, following 
others who had used the same phrase, the European nations formed a republic 
(la république générale). This republic, he argued, was grounded on the fact that 
all nations were bound to the balance of power and supported it. Maubert claimed 
that English domination of this republic threatened the equal right of all nations to 
the riches of the world and therefore an equal right to own the world’s trade. As the 
only possible manner to counter British hegemony, Maubert pleaded for an armed 
coalition of Continental powers.63
Justi claimed that Maubert’s malevolence was without comparison. In his 
view, not even Machiavelli was as vicious as Maubert.64 In Die Chimäre des 
Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt Justi emphasised that the French 
author had misunderstood the nature of trade and the concept of just neutrality. In 
defense of England Justi emphasised that the Navigation Acts were a just measure, 
since every nation was the master of its own trade. In the words of Istvan Hont in 
his recent study on ‘Jealousy of Trade’: “Instead of trying to subject trade to the 
realist logic of the balance of power, Justi argued, one ought to respect the right of 
nations to disengage from certain individual branches of trade.”65 His take on the 
Navigation Acts exemplified Justi’s general logic.
Justi believed in self-balancing mechanisms of international free trade. The 
commerce of a state was based on natural circumstances, such as the fertility of 
59 J. H. G. von Justi, Leben und Character des Königl. Pohlnischen und Churfürstl. Sächs.. Premier-
Ministre Grafens von Brühl, 3 vols. (Frankfurt, 1760–1764). See also Adam, Political Economy, pp. 
157–63.
60 Ere Nokkala, “Debatten mellan J.H.G. von Justi och H.L. von Heß om frihetstidens författning”, 
Historisk Tidskrift för Finland 94 (2009), pp. 20–55.
61 For comparison see Alimento’s chapter in this issue.
62 Jean-Henri Maubert de Gouvest, Le politique danois, ou, L’ambition des Anglais démasquée 
par leurs pirateries: ouvrage dans lequel on recherche laquelle des deux nations de la France ou de 
l’Angleterre, a dérangé par ses hostilités l’harmonie de l’Europe, & où l’on prouve aux Souverains 
de quelle importance il est pour eux d’abattre l’orgueil de ce people (Copenhaguen, 1756).
63 Maubert de Gouvest, Le politique danois, pp. 18–20; Stapelbroek, “Universal Society”, pp. 65–
6. 
64 von Justi, Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung, p. 9. 
65 Hont, Jelousy of Trade, p. 35. 
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the land and the geographical location. But above all it was based on the qualities 
of the inhabitants. Foreign trade was based on the high quality and low price of the 
products that a country was producing. This combination again was impossible to 
achieve without skilfulness and industry of the inhabitants. The equality of commerce 
could be reached only by promoting equality in skilfulness and industry, which 
would discourage the development. Besides, it was not possible that England could 
gain commercial monopoly. At some point the price of labour and commodities in 
England would rise to such a level that poorer nations would be able to destroy 
their previously solid market position. The amount of money in circulation and the 
concomitant price rises further stimulated by foreign trade surpluses would finally 
erode the price competitiveness of manufactured export goods. For this reason Justi 
believed that the world economy could not be dominated by one nation.66 Justi’s 
idea of the self-destructive character of competition is similar to Montesquieu’s 
ideas presented in his essay on universal monarchy Réflexions sur la Monarchie 
Universel en Europe (1734). In this essay Montesquieu claimed that universal 
monarchy was morally impossible. No one ever had been in position to actually 
achieve universal monarchy.67 One of the explaining factors was the intertwined 
nature of political and commercial power. Following Montesquieu, Justi argued that 
a world monopoly of trade was impossible because of the self-cancelling character 
of international competitiveness.
The Principle of Impartiality Reconsidered – 
Dutch Neutrality as Abusive Neutrality
After dispening with the argument of French pamphleteers for the necessity of an 
anti-British league, Justi turned to their portrayal of the alleged British mistreatment 
of neutral ships. Here Justi was on thin ice. In 1748 he had explicitly questioned the 
confiscation of Prussian ships by British privateers and praised France. However, 
in 1758, the setting differed considerably from the one of the War of the Austrian 
Succession. Following the renversement des alliances Prussia had become an 
ally of England and enemy of France. Yet, rather than disregard his earlier essay 
on maritime neutral trade, Justi republished his essay in his Historische und 
Juristische Schriften (1760) with a number of additional footnotes that qualified 
his previous position.68 The alterations had to do with a redefinition of what he 
understood as “taking the position of the enemy”. In his original Erörterungen Justi 
had argued that taking the position of the enemy was the most crucial violation of 
impartiality. In his new footnotes he argued that neutral nations may not become 
66 Hont, Jelousy of Trade, p. 36; Adam, Political Economy, p. 89. 
67 John Robertson, “Universal Monarchy and the Liberties of Europe: David Hume’s Critique of 
an English Whig Doctrine,” Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, eds. Nicholas Phillipson and 
Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 349–73.
68 J. H. G. von Justi, Historische und Juristische Schriften, vol. 1 (Frankfurt, 1760), pp. 140–70. 
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mere carriers of enemy’s trade. If this took place, the neutral had turned into an 
enemy. This redefinition of taking the role of the enemy was an argument against 
Dutch neutrality, which according to Justi, far from neutral, was motivated by 
subsuming peace to greed – in the case of the Dutch, profit motivated shipping of 
French goods from its Caribbean colonies that prolongued the Seven Years’ War.69
The last Chapter of Justi’s Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und 
Schiffahrt was dedicated to a defence of England’s hostile policy towards Dutch 
trade from the French colonies and gave a detailed exposition of how the Dutch 
adopted and justified the position of the French.70 Justi argued that there were two 
rival views on how to understand neutrality. First, one could claim that neutrals 
ought to show the same impartial behaviour towards both belligerents. According 
to Justi this definition was lacking because something that helps one belligerent 
is not necessarily beneficial to the other and therefore never required from the 
neutral. For instance, England would not gain in the same manner as France if 
Dutch traders would take over its colonial trade. The second definition of neutrality 
stated that the neutral shall not strengthen either of the belligerents. This, for Justi, 
was too strict a position that would affect to an unnecessary degree the rights 
of neutrals by seriously limiting their commercial freedom. In fact, it would put a 
halt to all trade, since any kind of trade with a belligerent strengthened him in a 
direct manner (unmittelbarer weise). Justi chose to leave the definition of general 
neutrality rather open. However, he asserted that maritime neutrality as a specific 
but important part of neutrality was more easily defined. The duties of neutrality are 
respected as long as a neutral state does not take the role of the belligerent or give 
the enemy shelter from persecutions (Verfolgungen). In practice, this meant that 
neutrals could not provide ammunition or weapons to belligerents. A neutral was 
allowed to sell these goods, but not actually to deliver them. In a similar way, and 
more important and contested, a neutral was not allowed to take over the enemy’s 
own trade and continue it as a carrier (eigene Schiffahrt des Feindes übernimmt 
und fortsetzet). This problem was at stake in the clash between Britain and Holland. 
The Dutch offered France a way out (Ausweg) and enabled the French to save 
their overseas trade. In contrast with the previous French colonial trade monopoly, 
neutral, especially Dutch ships, were given the right to carry goods to and from 
French colonies during the Seven Years’ War. According to Justi, this was not 
ordinary trade in the way described in his essay on neutral trade. Dutch ships were 
69 von Justi, Historische und Juristische, p. 152. Here Justi added a footnote to point out that 
being a mere carrier of enemy goods out of greed violated the principles of neutrality and that it 
was self-evident that goods of war loaded on belligerents bill could be confiscated. See footnote k: 
“Dieses verstehet sich mit der Einschränkung, wenn ein neutrales Volk schon vor dem Kriege einen 
dergleichen Handel zu treiben gewohnt gewesen ist. Allein wenn der eine kriegführende Theil zu 
Friedenszeiten keiner Nation die Handlung in seine Colonie gestattet, und hernach aus Noth, weil 
er seine Schiffahrt nicht schützen kann, die Häfen seiner Colonie öfnet, wie in dem jetzigen Krieg 
Frankreich thut, so ist das ein ganzer anderer Fall. Die neutralen Nationen, die in einen solchen 
neuen Handel, und vorher ungewöhnlichen Handel anfangen. Sie treten an die Stelle des Feindes. 
[…] Sie handeln aus Gewinnsucht.” 
70 von Justi, Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung, pp. 75–86.
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not engaged in their own trade with France, but were carrying goods for France –
which they had been barred from previously. The Dutch were thus in Justi’s terms 
taking the position of the enemy. Justi’s earlier essay on neutral trade did not 
mention this particular way in which a neutral took the position of the enemy, but 
Justi included it in the footnotes of the reprint and referred to the behaviour of 
the Dutchmen.71 He claimed that the Dutch had become not only enemies, but 
true aggressors. Consequently, the claim that the British mistreated neutrals was 
false, since the Dutch were not in fact neutral. This reasoning completely proved 
Maubert wrong and demonstrated the extent of his malevolence.72 Further proof of 
this line of reasoning was the fact that England did not interrupt Dutch trade from 
elsewhere, but only from the French colonies. Thus Justi’s position can be seen 
easily as a part of the vast amount of contemporary literature on the distinction 
between neutral trade with the enemy and trade for the enemy. Justi was in favour 
of what we know as the Rule of 1756, which stipulated that neutrals refrained from 
trade in wartime that was closed to them in time of peace.73
Danish Neutrality as a Model for Prussia
In 1757 Count Johann Hartwig Ernst Bernstorff (1712–1772) invited Justi to 
Copenhagen. Justi may have had some influence in Denmark.74 However, 
Denmark and Bernstorff seem to have had an even greater influence on Justi. His 
new and powerful patron conducted Denmark’s foreign policy between 1751 and 
1770 and was a devoted supporter of commercial neutrality. In the historiography 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Bernstorff’s political vision was 
often idealised. Scholars referred to the moral superiority of the legal framework 
of Bernstorff’s foreign policy. More recent scholarship has started to emphasise 
the importance of the economic framework. Neutrality was economically highly 
advantageous for Danish shipping and commerce. Therefore, neutrality was not 
as much a struggle for survival as a competition for prosperity.75 Justi became a 
fond admirer of Berstorff’s foreign policy. While rejecting Dutch claims to neutral 
rights Justi praised Danish neutrality as wise foreign policy. Justi did not go into 
great theoretical detail in his discussions of the principles of Danish neutrality. 
71 von Justi, Historische und Juristische, p. 152, footnote k and p. 156, footnote l. 
72 von Justi, Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung, p. 21.
73 Helfman, “Neutrality”, p. 550. See also Richard Pares, Colonial blockade and neutral rights 
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It was rather the mechanism of how Danish neutrality contributed to economic 
development that he admired. Justi was himself in Denmark in 1758 and according 
to some sources he acted as a customs director (Kolonial-Inspektor) there.76 In any 
case, he had first-hand information about the success of Danish neutrality, both in 
keeping Denmark out of war and in triggering an increase in foreign trade.
According to Justi, even the most successful wars were disastrous enterprises. 
Warfare caused depopulation, currency disorders and tax rises and suffocated 
foreign commerce and the development of manufacturing industry.77 Whereas 
all belligerents were certain that they could improve their circumstances through 
war, Justi stressed that if states invested in commerce and manufacturing, these 
would produce far wiser and greater conquests.78 From his Danish experience Justi 
had recognised the opportunities neutrality could offer which led to his wish that 
Germany and especially Prussia would follow the Danish example. Justi believed 
markets could not be conquered – but they could be lost or obtained during 
wartime: while two powers were fighting commercial wars it was comparatively 
easy to increase one’s share by staying out of the conflict. This issue was more 
broadly discussed in Germany. The anonymous author of the Hülfleistungen stated 
that neutrality did not automatically increase the relative power of a neutral state 
while belligerents weakened each other.79 Justi disagreed and argued that while 
France and England were fighting, the real winner was neutral Denmark, which 
presented an exemplary case of the practice of this wise Staatskunst in the Seven 
Years’ War.80 Therefore, Justi’s future vision for Germany included a policy of what 
he called ‘fixed neutrality’ (vestgesetzte Neutralität), which would function as a tool 
in leaving behind the wars that had been so harmful for Germany’s economy during 
the past two hundred years.81
In order to understand Justi’s proposal better one needs to return to Die Chimäre 
des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt. There Justi criticised the author 
of the Politique Danois of 1756 for not at all understanding the Danish interest 
and predicament. Maubert, whom Justi believed to be the writer, had claimed that 
Denmark ought to join the war effort against England. According to Justi, if Denmark 
changed its peaceful attitude it would be more advantageous to join England and 
76 Reinert, “Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi”, p. 45. 
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81 von Justi, Wohlgemeynte Vorschläge, pp. 44–.
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Prussia. However, Justi pointed out that the wisest strategy for Denmark was to 
remain neutral and concentrate on the development of its economy and trade. 
Instead of trying to conquer back its old provinces from Sweden (Scania and 
Bleking) Denmark concentrated on domestic economic development. It was clear 
that Justi’s point equally regarded Austria, which should refrain from attempting to 
conquer back Silesia from Prussia and focus on cultivating its own agriculture and 
commerce. To give his arguments more force Justi referred to his experiences in 
Denmark and mentioned, for example, that the sale of sugar had increased by 800, 
000 thaler. According to Justi, it was a general principle of prolonged commercial 
wars that both parties in the conflict lost parts of their share in global trade to non-
belligerent parties. Justi elaborated on the issue by using a historical example. 
Denmark and Sweden had started a commercial war against the Hanseatic 
League that was fundamentally a just war. As a result of this war the Hanseatic 
League’s trade decreased, but Denmark and Sweden did not gain. The real winner 
of the war had been Holland. The moral of the story was that when two powerful 
nations entered into a long-lasting commercial war the best policy was neutrality.82 
Justi believed that the dominant eighteenth-century rivalry between France and 
England would spill over into wars time and again in the near future. The best 
policy for Germany was to ‘fix’ its neutrality and to build up its foreign trade, thus 
catching up with France and England while these two powers weakened each 
other. Questioning the logic of Justi’s position from a diplomatic perspective, his 
Austrian commentator asked what kind of English ally Prussia was if it abandoned 
Britain despite all the subsidies the British had paid.83 Justi rhetorically took this 
point as further proof of the fact that he had not written on command or inspired 
by political motives, but only out of patriotic love for Germany (aus patriotischen 
Liebe vor Teutschland) – that he had confronted the issues of neutrality as an 
independent thinker and that precisely this had enabled him to properly address 
the wider problems of peace and trade.84
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